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Abstract 
It is common to hear talk of the aim of belief and to find philosophers appealing to 
that aim for numerous explanatory purposes. What belief’s aim explains depends, of 
course, on what that aim is. Many hold that it is somehow related to truth, but there 
are various ways in which one might specify belief’s aim using the notion of truth. In 
this paper, by considering whether they can account for belief’s standard of 
correctness and the epistemic norms governing belief, I argue against certain 
prominent specifications of belief’s aim given in terms of truth and advance a 
neglected alternative. 
 
It should not be imagined that there is much to endure in the search after truth.  
(Malebranche) 
 
Error is the cause of men’s misery […] We may hope for sound and genuine 
happiness only by seriously labouring to avoid it.  
(Malebranche)
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1 Liberals and conservatives 
It is common to hear talk of the aim of belief and to come across philosophers 
invoking such an aim for various explanatory purposes. For example, philosophers 
appeal to belief’s aim in attempting to account for what distinguishes belief from 
other psychological attitudes (Railton 1994; Velleman 2000), the normativity of 
mental content (Boghossian 2008, ch. 4), the nature and force of theoretical reasoning 
(Velleman 2000), the character of deliberation concerning what to believe (Steglich-
Petersen 2006), the paradoxical nature of Moorean beliefs such as that it’s raining but 
I don’t believe that it’s raining (Millar 2009; Railton 1994; Williams 1973, p. 137), 
belief’s standard of correctness (see §4 below), the epistemic norms governing belief 
(see §5 below), that subjects are motivated (not) to believe certain things on the basis 
of the evidence they take themselves to possess (McHugh Forthcoming; Steglich-
Petersen 2009, pp. 395-396) and that subjects cannot believe at will (Engel 2002, pp. 
133-134; Williams 1973, ch. 9). 
It would be nice if belief’s aim could explain such things. But that depends on 
what that aim is. Arguably, philosophers most frequently appeal to the notion of truth 
when specifying it. However, there are various ways in which one might formulate 
the aim of belief in this way, including: 
(LIB) Belief aims at the truth. 
(CON) Belief aims only at the truth. 
In the next section, I shall spell out how I understand the aims here attributed. For 
now, note that (LIB) is the orthodox construal of belief’s aim; it is by far the most 
common way in which philosophers characterise that aim using the notion of truth.
2
 In 
contrast, (CON) is somewhat neglected.
3
 
The distinction between (LIB) and (CON) is rarely noted; where it is, it is not 
usually accorded much importance. There is a tendency for philosophers to move 
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without comment from one formulation of belief’s aim to the other or to a 
combination of both, assuming, perhaps, that the difference between them is merely 
notional.
4
 The difference is, however, substantive. One place in which this shows up, 
as I shall discuss below, is in philosophers’ attempts to put (LIB) to explanatory uses 
which are in fact not served by it but by (CON), and vice versa. 
 One aim of this paper is to show that the superficial similarity between (LIB) 
and (CON) hides great differences. First, I shall argue that, at the intuitive level, it is 
more plausible to think that (CON), rather than (LIB), captures belief’s aim. Others 
have noted that (LIB) is somewhat counterintuitive but here I address some responses 
to this charge which have yet to receive attention. Moreover, it is often thought that 
(CON) is equally counterintuitive, a charge I shall reject. Next, I shall argue for (CON) 
and against (LIB) by examining certain of the explanatory purposes to which 
philosophers have put the idea that belief has an aim. In particular, it is widely held 
that, if (LIB) were true, it would explain belief’s standard of correctness. However, I 
shall argue that (LIB) fails in this respect and that it is instead (CON) which accounts 
for belief’s correctness-condition. Second, I shall show that (LIB) and (CON) present 
very different accounts of the normative considerations pertaining to belief and 
evidence. While the picture (LIB) presents might initially seem more promising, I 
shall argue that it is mistaken. In closing, I shall turn to a rather different conception 
of belief’s aiming at truth, which Velleman, among others, advances and which might 
seem to avoid the difficulties (LIB) faces, and suggest that it is explanatorily 
inadequate. 
The result of what follows will, I hope, be to show how important it is for 
philosophers to keep (LIB) and (CON) firmly apart and to make a case for thinking that, 
when kept apart in this way, (CON) is a more promising and explanatorily abundant 
way to formulate belief’s aim than (LIB).5 
4 
 
 
2 Setting the stage 
Before proceeding to explore the differences between (LIB) and (CON), several 
preliminary remarks are in order.  
First, I shall restrict my attention to the idea that the psychological attitude or 
mental state of believing has an aim, or that subjects have certain aims with regard to 
that attitude or mental state. A related thought is that the activity of inquiry—of 
investigating some subject matter with a view to finding something out about it—and 
the practices it involves have an aim or goal, which one might also specify using the 
notion of truth (see Kvanvig 2003, pp. 8-9; Lynch 2005, pp. 13-15; Lynch 2009, pp. 
226-227). Though one might expect there to be important connections between the 
aims of belief and of inquiry—not least because the upshot of inquiry is, or is 
supposed to be, belief concerning the relevant subject-matter—I shall set aside for 
present purposes the issue of what the goal of inquiry is, assuming there is one.
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Second, I shall focus only weighing up competing formulations of belief’s aim 
given in terms of truth. The most prominent alternative is to construe belief’s aim in 
terms of knowledge.
7
 I shall not examine the pros and cons of this approach, since 
there is enough here to be getting on with. That said, it is consistent with the 
formulation of belief’s aim which I shall recommend, namely (CON), that that aim is 
ultimately to be cashed out in terms of knowledge. Perhaps belief aims only at truth in 
aiming only at knowledge. 
 Third, one might object that we are not forced to choose between (LIB) and 
(CON). Perhaps belief aims at the truth and only at the truth.
8
 However, some of the 
objections I shall level at (LIB) apply equally to the conjunction of (LIB) and (CON). 
So, there is no harm in focusing on the conjuncts individually and it makes for a more 
straightforward presentation to do so.  
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 Fourth, I am not going to argue at length for the very idea that belief has an 
aim or provide direct responses to objections to that idea (e.g. Owens 2003). The 
focus, rather, is on adjudicating a dispute among those who hold that belief has an aim 
concerning how that aim should be construed. On the face of it, this issue is prior; one 
cannot settle whether or not belief has an aim in the absence of some concrete 
proposal as to what that aim might be. That said, I shall provide indirect support for 
the idea that belief has an aim—and, more specifically, that that aim can be profitably 
cashed out in terms of truth—by distinguishing (CON) from (LIB), and thereby 
distancing the strengths of (CON) from the weaknesses of (LIB). 
 Fifth, it is often alleged that belief cannot literally have an aim (e.g. Lynch 
2004, p. 499; Wedgwood 2002, p. 267). Beliefs are states or attitudes of subjects and, 
unlike subjects, not the sorts of things that can aim at anything. In attempting to 
unpack talk of belief’s aim, some take it as shorthand for talk of the causal regulation 
of belief states for truth at a sub-personal level (e.g. Velleman 2000). For reasons 
examining which would take us too far afield,
9
 I prefer to view the aim as one 
subjects possess at a personal level (which is not to reject claims about goings-on at 
the sub-personal level).
10
 
In general, a person’s aim is her goal; it is a thing wanted.11 So understood, an 
aim is that for the sake of which one acts and towards which one’s actions are directed. 
When one takes oneself to have undefeated reasons for having a certain aim, one 
might adopt it as one’s goal, in which case one’s goal is one’s intended end or one’s 
intention. For example, I might take the fact that I need to lose weight and the fact 
that I could raise sponsorship for a worthy cause to provide conclusive reasons for 
running a marathon. As a result, I might adopt running a marathon as a goal and, in 
doing so, form the intention to run a marathon, for the sake of which I start training. I 
shall conceive of the aim of belief as an agent’s goal in this sense, though I shall not 
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take a stand on whether the aim is also a believer’s intention.12 If one is 
unsympathetic to the conception of an aim I am exploiting, little in what follows 
hangs on it and the discussion could be reformulated in the preferred terms. 
Sixth, several philosophers claim that (in some sense) it is constitutive of an 
attitude’s being belief that it is formed with or governed by the relevant aim. This 
issue is contentious and not my immediate concern. For present purposes, I shall 
assume that it is at least necessary for having beliefs that one has the relevant aim— 
that the aim is not a contingent goal believers just happen to have—though nothing in 
what follows turns on this. 
Finally, in light of the above, I shall make explicit how I understand the aims 
(LIB) and (CON) attribute. According to (LIB), as I shall construe it, subjects aim to 
believe the truth, which is to say that subjects aim to believe a proposition if it is true. 
This corresponds to how many philosophers understand belief’s aim13 and, more 
importantly, it is a natural way to interpret talk of the aim to believe the truth. If I aim 
to steal the treasure, I will surely not be satisfied unless I steal all of it. Aiming to eat 
the cake is not the same as aiming to eat cake, or aiming to eat a portion of the cake. 
Consider also the following, seemingly innocent chain of reasoning: My aim is to 
meet the cast of Star Wars, but I’ve yet to meet Anthony Daniels, so I shall track him 
down. Naturalness aside, should my construal of (LIB) not suggest itself to others or 
fail to capture the thesis certain philosophers mean to advance, I shall consider other 
(more modest) aims as I proceed and it remains an independently interesting question 
whether (LIB), so construed, is true. 
According to (CON), as I shall construe it, subjects aim to believe only the 
truth, which is to say that subjects aim to believe a proposition only if it is true, which 
in turn is to say that subjects aim not to believe a proposition if it is false.
14
 Again, this 
reading is natural. If I aim to watch only English-language films, I might ensure I 
7 
 
achieve this by watching no films whatsoever. Aiming to purchase only Picassos is 
not the same as aiming to purchase all Picassos, all and only Picassos, or, indeed, any 
Picassos.
15
 Consider also the following, seemingly innocent chain of reasoning: My 
aim is to drink only the organic juice, and all that’s left is non-organic juice, so I shall 
not drink any juice. Naturalness aside, I shall suggest that, so interpreted, (CON) is 
defensible. 
 
3 Divine aspirations 
One obvious problem facing (LIB) is that the aim it attributes to subjects is 
unsatisfiable; finite believers cannot possibly achieve it. The relevant aim would be 
satisfied only if a subject believed all truths, yet there are infinitely more truths than 
any finite subject can believe and infinitely many truths too complex for any such 
subject to believe. It seems strange, if not incoherent, to attribute to believers such a 
manifestly unattainable aim. 
 An ardent proponent of (LIB) might not be moved by these considerations. The 
aim (LIB) attributes, she might suggest, is an ideal; though it is not achievable, it is 
something believers can aspire to. It is no sillier, she might continue, to attribute this 
aim to believers than it is to attribute to humans the desire to lead good lives.  
 One might worry that this reply does not take full measure of the concern, 
since the relevant goal is not one finite believers can even come close to; we are able 
to believe only a minute fraction of the infinite truths that there are. Quite apart from 
issues of achievability, the aim simply looks, to put it bluntly, a bit daft. Many, indeed 
most, truths are utterly trivial.
16
 Consider, for example, all the truths about the length 
and colour of each hair on David Cameron’s left arm. Why would anyone have as her 
goal believing such things? Whether all truths are believable or not, the vast majority 
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are not worth believing. Since one would expect any reasonable person to see this, 
one should not expect such persons to have as their aim believing all truths. 
 In response, (LIB)’s advocate might complain that these concerns trade on 
illegitimate considerations. Of course, she might protest, it does not appear to be 
worth believing the allegedly trivial truths about Cameron’s arm-hairs from the 
practical point of view—doing so would not further any of one’s practical goals—but 
this is precisely because action is not governed by the same aims as belief. However, 
she continues, the claim is only that it is worth believing such things from the 
epistemic point of view, that qua believer one aims to believe the truth (though qua 
agent one does not). So, the reply concludes, the aim (LIB) attributes only seems daft 
when viewed from a foreign perspective which does not share this aim, not when one 
inhabits the native perspective of the believer herself. 
 This reply does not get us far. It will not do simply to appeal to the epistemic 
perspective since the present dispute precisely concerns how to construe that 
perspective, that is, how best to specify the aim which characterises and informs it. 
Perhaps (LIB)’s proponent can reformulate the thought behind the reply without 
relying on the notion of an epistemic perspective.
17
 The point, she might say, is that, 
while we aim to believe the truth, we are complex creatures with various goals, many 
of them practical. We need to act as well as think! Often, these practical goals 
compete with the aim to believe the truth and, when the practical goals take 
precedence, we are not inclined to believe truths if doing so is not in the service of or 
conflicts with those goals, in which case, we do not view believing such truths to be 
worthwhile. It would be a mistake, the reply concludes, to take the fact that the aim, 
as captured by (LIB), is often, or even typically, overridden to show that believers 
have no such aim at all. 
9 
 
The worry remains, however, that this line of thought does not speak to the 
original objection. Suppose that one’s practical goals allow for one to believe the truth 
about the number of hairs on David Cameron’s arms. It remains extremely difficult to 
see why one would want to, or to imagine a person having this as her aim.  
To make the same point a different way, reintroducing talk of perspectives, it 
just does not seem to be the case that believing trivial truths appears pointless only 
from the practical perspective. Grimm, though his main focus is not the idea that 
belief has an aim, explicitly takes himself to be adopting the epistemic perspective 
when he makes the point: ‘If you propose an evening memorizing the phone book for 
Topeka, Kansas, and I decline, have I really missed an opportunity to enrich myself, 
from an epistemic point of view?’ (2008, p. 726; see also David 2005, pp. 298-299; 
Feldman 2000, p. 683). So, it does not appear to be the presence of competing 
practical aims and considerations which make the aim to believe a proposition if it is 
true seem an aim not worth having.
18
 
One might try to evade the above difficulties by revising (LIB) so that it 
attributes a more discriminating aim: 
 (NEOLIB) Belief aims at those truths one considers.
19
 
According to (NEOLIB), as I shall construe it, a subject aims to believe a proposition 
she considers if it is true. Alternatively, if a subject considers a proposition, she aims 
to believe it if it is true. While this might make the aim achievable—assuming that 
one can believe anything one can consider—it remains possible, perhaps likely, that 
among the truths one considers are utterly trivial truths, in which case it is hard to 
understand why one would aim to believe them. Limiting the scope of belief’s aim, as 
(NEOLIB) does, only postpones this problem rather than resolves it. 
 Furthermore, supposing that one aims to believe those truths one considers, it 
is not clear that this reflects an aim one has in believing as opposed to an aim one has 
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in considering. Consideration is a purposive activity and, arguably, one goes in for it 
with the goal of believing the truth. A case can be made, then, that (NEOLIB) is a 
somewhat infelicitous statement of the aim of considering, in which case, it is of no 
use to those attempting to specify the aim of believing. 
 Evidently, I have not shown (LIB), or the restricted version of it, to be false but 
I hope to have shown it to be a rather counterintuitive way of characterising belief’s 
aim. Of course, there might be strategies available to (LIB)’s proponent to respond to 
this challenge. However, I shall not rest my case on the above considerations. In the 
next sections, I shall turn to evaluate the explanatory potential of (LIB) and (NEOLIB) 
and argue that they do not hold much promise in this regard.  
 (CON), one might complain, is no more promising than (LIB). The problem is 
not so much that the aim (CON) attributes to believers is one of being infallible—an 
ideal we might approximate to, even if we inevitably fall short of it—but rather that 
the aim it attributes could be achieved if one had no beliefs at all.
20
 Surely, one’s aim 
qua believer cannot be to believe nothing. 
 I do not think that this highlight a problem akin to that facing (LIB). In the first 
instance, (CON) is compatible with the fact that subjects have additional aims, 
theoretical or practical, for the sake of which those subjects need to have various 
beliefs. All that (CON) maintains is that, in having those beliefs, subjects aim not to 
believe falsely. More importantly, while the aim (LIB) attributes is achieved in only 
one circumstance, namely, when a subject believes all truths, the aim (CON) attributes 
is not achieved only when a subject believes nothing; it would be achieved when a 
subject believes any number of things, none of which are false. So, it is not the aim to 
believe nothing and it is satisfiable, at least in principle. Also, the aim is not daft; it is 
not obviously silly to aim to avoid believing if in doing so one will believe falsely, 
however trivial the belief. While it seems daft to want to believe that David Cameron 
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has n hairs on his arms, if he does, it does not seem daft to want not to believe this, if 
he does not.
21
 
 Again, I shall not rest my case for (CON) on these considerations. Instead, I 
shall highlight its explanatory potential, which is the focus for the remaining sections. 
 
4 Setting the standard 
The following is, surely, the merest platitude: 
(CORRECT) For any p, believing that p is correct if and only if it is true that 
p. 
To my knowledge, all parties to the debate accept (CORRECT), whether they advocate 
(CON) or (LIB) or reject the very idea of an aim of belief.
22
 
As mentioned above, it is common for philosophers to appeal to belief’s aim 
in trying to account for the fact that belief’s correctness-condition is truth. And it is 
most common to invoke (LIB) in explaining the standard to which belief is subject. As 
Velleman states this ambition, ‘To say that belief aims at the truth is not simply to re-
express the norm stipulating that a belief must be true in order to be correct; rather, it 
is to point out a fact about belief that generates this norm for its correctness’ (2000, pp. 
16-17; cf. Humberstone 1992; Papineau 1999; Steglich-Petersen 2009).
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At a first stab, the explanation proceeds as follows. Subjects aim to believe the 
truth. This aim sets a standard for a given subject’s believing according to whether or 
not she achieves her aim in doing so. A subject’s beliefs are correct or incorrect 
insofar as they contribute to the realisation of her aim or otherwise. 
In general, however, if a person has a certain goal, it does not follow that 
actions that contribute to attaining or frustrating that goal are correct or incorrect 
respectively. Suppose, for example, that Damian’s goal is to kill all children under 
five. Given this goal, it does not follow that, if Damian kills a four-year old, his doing 
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so is correct. At most, it follows that, other things being equal, he takes it to be correct. 
So, returning to the case at hand, if (LIB) holds, at most it follows that, other things 
being equal, subjects take beliefs to be correct if and only they are true, not that 
beliefs are correct if and only they are true. To arrive at (CORRECT), one would 
require additional considerations which would show that the aim (LIB) attributes is an 
aim worth pursuing.
24
 
For reasons explored above, I doubt such considerations are forthcoming, but 
perhaps it would be sufficient for the proponent of (LIB)’s explanatory purpose to 
explain the fact that subjects take (CORRECT) to be true, whether or not it is.
25
 
If this explanation is to succeed, it requires an unrestricted version of (LIB). If 
one understood the relevant aim to be that which (NEOLIB) attributes, for example, 
one could not account for (CORRECT), for the simple reason that, unlike (NEOLIB), 
(CORRECT) is not limited to those propositions one considers. Many of the 
propositions one believes are not propositions one considers and yet it remains the 
case that, if any such proposition is true, believing it is correct.  
 Unfortunately, the unrestricted (LIB) does not fair much better as an 
explanation of subjects’ commitment to (CORRECT). Granted, if (LIB) were true, this 
would explain the fact that subjects take truly believing to be correct (since doing so 
accords with their goal), but it would not explain the fact that subjects take falsely 
believing not to be correct, i.e. to be incorrect. (LIB)’s suggestion that subjects aim at 
truth is consistent with the idea that they also aim at falsehood; perhaps subjects aim 
to believe all propositions. Were a person to have this as her goal, she would take 
believing falsehoods to be correct. Indeed, were a person to have the more modest 
goal of believing exactly ten falsehoods, she would not take believing falsehoods in 
general to be incorrect. For this reason, (LIB) is explanatorily inadequate; at most, it 
explains one half of (CORRECT).  
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 One might object that it is not possible to aim to believe all or any falsehoods. 
However, while I am sympathetic to this thought, it is not one (LIB)’s proponent is 
entitled to, since nothing in her conception of belief’s aim supports it. 
Consider instead (CON). For reasons explored above, if (CON) is true, 
(CORRECT) does not follow, at least pending considerations that show that aiming 
only to believe the truth is an aim worth pursuing. I am confident that one could 
muster such considerations but, for present purposes, I shall focus on whether (CON) 
could explain the fact that subjects endorse (CORRECT), whether or not they are right 
to do so. 
Unlike (LIB), (CON) straightforwardly accounts for the fact that subjects take 
believing falsehoods to be incorrect. Doing so conflicts with the aim of believing only 
the truth. 
One might object that, just as (LIB) fails to explain the fact that subjects take 
false beliefs to be incorrect, so (CON) fails to explain the fact that subjects take true 
beliefs to be correct. According to (CON), subjects aim not to believe falsehoods, but 
this is consistent with the aim of not believing truths, i.e. of believing nothing. Were a 
person to have this as her goal, the objection continues, she would not take believing 
truths to be correct. For this reason, (CON) is explanatorily inadequate. 
One can resolve this problem by assuming that (CON) specifies the unique 
general aim of belief, or at least that believers do not also aim not to believe truths. 
This seems a legitimate assumption and it would be sufficient to guarantee that (CON) 
accounts for believers’ commitment to (CORRECT). Suppose that, while (only) aiming 
not to believe falsehoods, a subject finds herself believing a truth. Believing this truth 
is not in the service of the subject’s aim but nor is it in conflict with it, so her doing so 
is not incorrect; hence, it is correct.
26
 
14 
 
(LIB)’s proponent might ask why this move is not available to her, why she 
cannot equally assume either that (LIB) specifies the unique general aim of belief or at 
least that subjects do not also aim to believe falsehoods. However, this assumption is 
insufficient to guarantee that (LIB) accounts for believers’ commitment to (CORRECT). 
Suppose that, while (only) aiming to believe truths, a subject finds herself believing a 
falsehood. Believing this falsehood is not in the service of the subject’s aim, but it is 
not in conflict with it, so her doing so is not incorrect; hence, it is correct. In light of 
this, it seems that Platts is wrong to claim that the thought that ‘beliefs aims at the 
truth’ implies that ‘falsity is a decisive failing in a belief’ (1997, p. 256).27 It is (CON), 
not (LIB), which has this implication. 
Surely, one might object, if a subject aims to believe the truth and believes a 
falsehood, she is failing in her aim. Hence, if she aims to believe the truth, believing a 
falsehood is incorrect, given that aim (cf. Littlejohn 2010, p. 80). 
This is mistaken—to say that a subject aims to believe the truth is to say 
nothing whatsoever about her attitude toward falsity. Suppose that I aim to drink 
coffee. Suppose also that I drink whiskey. Am I thereby failing in my aim? No—I 
might drink whiskey and coffee, or even whiskey in coffee, and, moreover, I might 
aim to do so. Only if my aim were to drink only coffee would I be failing in that aim 
in drinking whiskey.  
One might respond to this as follows. Drinking coffee does not preclude 
drinking whiskey. Hence, drinking whiskey does not thwart my aim to drink coffee. 
In contrast, believing a falsehood precludes believing a truth. Hence, believing falsely 
thwarts a subject’s aim of believing truly. But this is mistaken. First, believing a 
falsehood does not preclude truly believing lots of other propositions. Second, 
believing falsely that p does not even preclude believing truly that not-p (at least, 
when the inconsistency is not apparent). Hence, if a subject aims to believe the truth, 
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it does not follow from the fact that she believes a falsehood that she is failing in her 
aim. All of this is just a long way of saying that one must not confuse (CON) with 
(LIB).  
Perhaps (LIB)’s proponent could muster considerations that show that having 
false beliefs ultimately thwarts the aim of believing the truth. However, such 
considerations are likely to be not only contentious but complex and sophisticated. 
Recall that (LIB) is supposed to explain subjects’ unreflective, immediate acceptance 
of (CORRECT); thus, it would surely count against (LIB) if it presents such acceptance 
as mediated by appreciation of relatively arcane matters. 
I have argued that (LIB) fails to account for subjects’ commitment to 
(CORRECT). In contrast, (CON) straightforwardly explains why subjects—safely 
excluding those who aim to believe nothing—are committed to (CORRECT). A 
remaining worry with (CON) might be that, even if it can explain the fact that subjects 
take false belief to be incorrect, it cannot explain the fact that they take belief to be the 
only correct attitude to have toward a truth; not believing or withholding belief from a 
truth would be consistent with the aim specified by (CON) and so, by the lights of that 
aim, correct. 
This is true but it does not point to a vice of (CON) but a virtue. It is no part of 
the above platitude that belief is the uniquely correct attitude to have towards a truth; 
(CORRECT) only claims that believing the truth is correct, not that it is the correct 
attitude to have. And that seems right. Unlike believing a falsehood, it is not a mistake 
not to believe a certain truth. Presumably, there is a truth about how many hairs are to 
be found on David Cameron’s arms. I am surely not in error in not believing it.  
No doubt there are situations in which it would be a mistake not to believe a 
truth. Suppose that I am a referee at a football match and, while distracted, fail to see 
that a goal has been scored, as a result of which I fail to believe this. In this case, my 
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not believing the truth is incorrect, but this stems from other considerations than the 
truth of a given proposition alone—relating to my responsibilities as a referee—or 
from other aims than that which (CON) attributes—the aims of football.28 
These remarks point to a further flaw in (LIB); it implies that belief is the 
uniquely correct attitude to have toward a truth—since believing the truth is the only 
thing that accords with the aim (LIB) attributes—and so it implies that it would be 
incorrect to do anything other than believe a truth, including not believing it. This 
implication, I have argued, is false. 
So, it turns out that (LIB) not only fails to account for the fact that subjects 
take false beliefs to be incorrect but wrongly suggests that subjects take anything 
other than belief in a truth to be incorrect. In contrast, (CON) succeeds in accounting 
for subjects’ commitment to no more and no less than (CORRECT). 
 
5 Demanding evidence 
In this section, I shall consider attempts to appeal to belief’s aim to explain certain 
facts about evidence. I shall argue, first, that (LIB) and (CON) present very different 
accounts of the normative force or role of evidence and, second, that the picture (CON) 
presents is, despite appearances perhaps, more accurate than that which (LIB) 
presents.
29
 
For present purposes, I shall take evidence to be constituted by facts. For a fact 
to be one’s evidence, for one to be in a position to believe on the basis of it, one has to 
believe that that fact obtains.
30
 If one is not sympathetic to this conception of evidence, 
it should be possible to replace it with one’s preferred alternative without affecting the 
arguments.
31
 
 Consider (LIB). Suppose that Holly’s shoes are in the hall and that this is 
evidence that Holly is home. For reasons explored in the previous section, if (LIB) 
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were true, it would not follow that this evidence is a normative reason for one to 
believe that Holly is home, i.e. a consideration that speaks in favour of believing 
this—that depends on whether the aim it attributes is worth pursuing. Again, for 
reasons explored earlier, I doubt it is but I shall not press that point here. For present 
purposes, it is enough to note that, if (LIB) were true, it would follow that we take 
evidence that Holly is home to be a pro tanto reason for believing that she is home.
32
 
We would take this evidence to be a consideration that speaks in favour of so 
believing because the fact that Holly’s shoes are in the hall indicates that believing 
that Holly is home accords with the aim of believing the truth, i.e. indicates that the 
belief that Holly is home is true. Moreover, if the reason provided by the evidence 
that Holly is home is undefeated, we would take it to follow that one ought to believe 
this, given the evidence.
33
 More generally, (LIB) suggests that subjects take evidence 
to be, or to provide, reasons to believe.
34
 
 Next, suppose that there are epistemic norms governing belief. Among them 
might be norms relating to evidence. (LIB) would seem to suggest that belief is 
governed by the following general principle, or at least that believers are committed to 
it: 
(PRE) For any p, if a subject has (sufficient) evidence that p, then she should 
believe that p.
35
 
One way to construe this is instrumentally. The thought is that, if one aims to believe 
the truth, one is committed to taking the means to fulfilling that aim.
36
 As Owens 
neatly summarises the idea, though he does not endorse it, if the goal of belief is truth, 
‘epistemic norms are instructions about how to reach that goal’ (2003, p. 283).37  
 Compare (CON). Suppose again that the fact that Holly’s shoes are in the hall 
is evidence that she is home. Unlike (LIB), (CON) does not suggest that we take this 
evidence to be a normative reason for one to believe that Holly is home, i.e. a 
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consideration that speaks in favour of believing this. Rather, if (CON) were true, it 
would follow that we take it to be the case that, given the evidence that Holly is home, 
there is no reason not to believe that she is home. On this picture, we take such 
evidence to be a warrant or entitlement—though not a reason—to believe that Holly is 
home because the fact that her shoes are in the hall indicates that this belief will not 
conflict with the aim to avoid falsehood, i.e. it indicates that the belief that Holly is 
home is true. Moreover, if the warrant or entitlement provided by the evidence that 
Holly is home is undefeated, we would take it to follow that one may believe this, 
given the evidence, though not that one ought to do so. 
 Suppose instead that Holly’s shoes are not in the hall and that this is evidence 
that she is not home. (CON) suggests that we take this evidence to be a pro tanto 
reason not to believe that Holly is home. Subjects would take this evidence to be a 
consideration that speaks against believing that Holly is home because the fact that 
her shoes are not in the hall indicates that this belief will conflict with the aim to 
avoid falsehood, i.e. indicates that the belief that Holly is home is false. Moreover, if 
the reason not to believe that Holly is home provided by the evidence is undefeated, 
we would take it to follow that one should not believe this, given the evidence.  
Finally, suppose again that there are epistemic norms governing belief, 
including norms relating to evidence. Unlike (LIB), (CON) does not suggest that belief 
is governed by (PRE), since (PRE) does not specify a means of fulfilling the aim (CON) 
attributes.
38
 However, (CON) does imply that belief is governed by the following 
general principles: 
(PRO) For any p, if a subject has (sufficient) evidence that it is false that p, 
she may not believe that p. 
(PER) For any p, if a subject has (sufficient) evidence that p, she may believe 
that p. 
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The thought behind (PRO) is that, if one aims to believe only the truth, one is 
committed to taking the means to fulfilling that aim, while (PER) provides general 
guidance as to when believing is not in conflict with that aim. 
 To summarise, given (LIB), one would expect evidence that p to be a reason to 
believe that p, and for belief in general to be subject to (PRE). In contrast, given (CON), 
one would expect evidence that p to be a warrant to believe that p, evidence that not p 
to be a reason not to believe that p, and for belief in general to be subject to both (PRO) 
and (PER). 
It has not been recognised that (LIB) does not imply that subjects take 
evidence that a proposition is false to be a consideration that speaks against believing 
it. As discussed earlier, for all that (LIB) says, a subject might aim to believe all 
propositions, in which case evidence that a proposition is false would not be an 
indication that believing it would conflict with her aim. Likewise, (LIB) fails to 
explain (PRO) since, once again, it says nothing about subjects’ attitudes toward 
falsity; believing propositions in the face of evidence is not in conflict with the aim 
(LIB) attributes.
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This reveals (LIB) to be explanatorily inadequate. It is a strike against (LIB) 
that it fails to explain the fact that we take evidence against a proposition to be a 
reason not to believe it and our commitment to the seemingly plausible (PRO). (If (LIB) 
fails in this respect, then evidently (NEOLIB) fails too.) 
 One might think that it is equally a strike against (CON) that it fails to explain 
the fact that we take evidence that a proposition is true to be a reason to believe it and 
our commitment to the seemingly plausible (PRE). Indeed, the idea that evidence that 
p is, as such, reason to believe that p is widespread.
40
 However, while full discussion 
of this view is beyond the scope of this paper, I shall make a case for thinking that it is 
false while accommodating the thoughts that might lie behind it. 
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 It is not clear that, in general, one has reason to believe, or ought to believe, 
that for which one has evidence.
41
 Any given fact is evidence for an infinite number 
of propositions. That Holly’s shoes are in the hall might be evidence for the belief that 
Holly is home, but it is equally evidence for the belief that footwear is in the hall, that 
the house has a hall, that shoes exist, that Holly has legs, that Holly is not a kangaroo, 
that there is no golden trumpet in the space currently occupied by Holly’s shoes, that 
either Holly is home or the moon is made of cheese, and so on. In light of this, it 
should be clear that it cannot be the case that one has reason to believe everything for 
which one has evidence or that one ought to. There are infinitely more such 
propositions than one can believe, and as many such propositions that are too complex 
for one to believe, and it cannot be the case that one ought or has reason to do 
something one cannot do. The principle that ought implies can is, of course, 
controversial, and even those who endorse the principle disagree over how it applies, 
but the case need not rest on it. The crucial point is that it is implausible to hold that 
subjects have reason to believe or should believe all and any propositions for which 
there is evidence when the vast majority of those propositions are utterly trivial and 
not worth believing.  
The thought above echoes those expressed in §3 and I shall not repeat the 
arguments here. But it is worth adding that our practices of epistemic assessment and 
criticism seem to accord with the picture which (CON) presents. For example, suppose 
that Elliot knows that Holly’s shoes are in the hall and, on the basis of this and 
perhaps other considerations, comes to believe that she is home but not that there is no 
golden trumpet in the space currently occupied by Holly’s shoes. Surely, we would 
not take Elliot for this reason alone to be epistemically irresponsible or out of order 
and are not in the habit of criticising people for not having such beliefs.
42
 This is just 
as well, since we are constantly guilty of not believing an endless number of such 
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things! Perhaps these considerations are not decisive but they suggest that the more 
austere picture of evidence and the norms governing it which (CON) presents is more 
accurate than the excessively demanding picture (LIB) presents. 
 Surely, one might object, there are cases in which we criticise subjects for not 
believing propositions for which they possess sufficient evidence or in which we take 
the evidence to be a reason for having certain beliefs. Indeed, arguably such cases are 
common.  
This is true. But (CON) is entirely consistent with this. Such cases are ones in 
which, given the circumstances, we take a subject to have reasons to believe certain 
things, or to be subject to certain norms. For example, suppose that Stanley is a 
detective investigating a murder and there is overwhelming evidence that Plum killed 
Peacock in the conservatory with the candlestick. We would typically take Stanley to 
have reason to believe this and, if he fails to do so, we would judge that he does not 
believe as he should. However, that Stanley has such reasons and is open to such 
assessment is surely not due merely to the evidence he has but, in addition, the need to 
restore justice, the responsibility he assumes in taking on the role of detective, his 
aims in investigating the murder, and so on. So, while (CON) does not account directly 
for cases in which, given the evidence, a subject has reason or ought to believe certain 
things, it certainly allows for them. 
To put the thought another way, it is useful to distinguish a reason to form a 
belief as to whether p and a reason for believing that p. In my view, contra (LIB), we 
do not take the mere fact that one has evidence that p to be a reason for believing that 
p. However, if there is reason to form a belief as to whether p, then the fact that one 
has evidence that p is a reason to believe that p. In the case above, we take Stanley’s 
evidence to be a reason for him to believe that Plum killed Peacock, given also that 
we take him to have reason to form a belief about this matter. 
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 The proponent of (LIB) might reply that her view was only ever that subjects 
aim to belief a truth if they have reason to have a belief about that matter. If so, then 
(LIB) is, to say the least, a misleading formulation of that view. Moreover, and more 
importantly, (LIB) is superfluous; we only need (CON) to explain what is going on in 
such cases. If for some reason one has to form a belief as to whether p, and if one 
aims not to believe falsely, then one has to believe truly, in which case, one would 
take evidence that p to be reason to believe that p. 
 Note also that (LIB), understood in the above way, is explanatorily inadequate. 
To return to an earlier issue, that subjects aim to believe a truth if they have reason to 
have a belief about that matter would not account for their commitment to (CORRECT), 
for the straightforward reason that (CORRECT) is not restricted to those propositions 
one has reason to adopt a doxastic attitude toward. So, the unrestricted (CON) is still 
called for. 
 Returning to the issue at hand, I acknowledged that (CON) does not suggest 
that subjects take evidence that p to be a reason to believe that p, or that subjects 
endorse (PRE). However, I have argued that, rather than being a shortcoming, this 
might count in (CON)’s favour. While a full exploration of the issue is beyond the 
scope of this paper, it is at least not obvious that we think that subjects have reason to 
believe or should believe a proposition simply because there is evidence for it. 
Moreover, (CON)’s proponent can account for the fact that there are many cases in 
which, given other factors, we do think a subject should or has reason to believe a 
proposition given the evidence, which in turn might satisfy the kinds of intuitions 
which might lead one to advance a principle like (PRE). 
In summary, I have stressed that (CON) and (LIB) present very pictures of the 
normative status of evidence and the general principles concerning it, and have argued 
that the picture (CON) is the more accurate. 
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6 Particular and general 
According to (LIB), as I have presented it, subjects aim to believe a proposition if it is 
true. While Velleman speaks readily of belief’s aiming at the truth, his considered 
remarks attribute a more cautious aim to belief. According to Velleman, subjects have 
no ‘global epistemological project of accumulating true beliefs’; they do not have 
‘designs on truths in general, or Truth in the abstract’ (2000, p. 252). For Velleman, 
there is no general aim of belief as such; rather, there are particular aims one has in 
believing particular propositions. Specifically, in believing a certain proposition, one 
has the aim ‘of getting the truth-value of that particular proposition right’ (2000, pp. 
251-252). As Velleman encapsulates the idea, ‘each instance of belief must aim at the 
truth in its own right’ (2000, p. 279).43 
 Velleman’s conception of (each) belief’s aim is consistent with (CON). If, in 
general, I aim to believe only the truth, it would follow that, in believing any given 
proposition, I aim to believe it only if it is true. However, Velleman presents his 
account of the particular aims one has in believing particular propositions as opposed 
to the idea that there is some general aim of belief. Unfortunately, in avoiding 
generality, Velleman relinquishes explanatory power. For Velleman, the relevant aim 
does not, as it were, kick in until the belief is formed. As a result, he cannot appeal to 
belief’s aim in trying to account, for example, for the fact that we take evidence 
against the truth of a proposition to be a reason not to believe it.
44
 
 To appreciate this, suppose that I believe that Holly is home. According to 
Velleman, in believing this, I aim not to believe falsely. It follows that, if there is 
evidence that Holly is not home, I have some reason not to believe that she is home, 
i.e. to give up my belief, since I have some reason to think that continuing to believe 
that Holly is home would conflict with my aim in doing so. So far so good. However, 
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suppose that I have no belief at all as to whether Holly is home and there is evidence 
that she is not home. Intuitively, this evidence remains a reason not to believe that 
Holly is home. How could Velleman account for this, given that he denies that 
subjects have a general goal of not believing falsehoods and holds that subjects only 
have goals with respect to the beliefs they actually possess? One cannot explain the 
reasons there are for not having a belief by appeal to an aim one does not have (since 
one does lacks the corresponding belief). 
Velleman might try to account for the reasons there are for not having the 
relevant belief by appeal to the aim one would have if one were to form that belief. 
But that will not work. At most, that one would have an aim if one were to have a 
certain belief would explain the reasons one would then have, i.e. the reasons one has 
in the counterfactual world, not the reasons one has in the actual world. Suppose I aim 
to bake a cake. Given this, that my cupboards are bare might be a reason to shop for 
ingredients. But suppose I do not aim to bake a cake. In that case, that my cupboards 
are bare is no longer a reason to shop for ingredients. Moreover, from the fact that I 
would have a reason to shop for ingredients if I were to aim to bake a cake, it hardly 
follows that the fact that my cupboards are bare is a reason to shop for ingredients. 
 So, given that Velleman attributes to subjects only particular aims in believing 
particular propositions, and not a general aim not to believe certain things, he is 
unable to explain certain facts about reasons for beliefs which subjects do not 
presently have. This is not, of course, to show that Velleman is wrong to suggest that 
subjects, in believing a particular proposition, aim only to believe the truth, but to 
suggest that such particular aims cannot do the explanatory work he asks of them. 
 
7 Conclusion 
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According to (LIB), a subject aims to believe a proposition if it is true. According to 
(CON), a subject aims to believe a proposition only if it is true, which is to say, a 
subject aims not to believe a proposition if it is false. I have argued that (CON) is more 
plausible as a characterisation of belief’s aim than (LIB), that (CON) has greater 
explanatory power than (LIB), since it alone accounts for the correctness condition for 
belief, that (CON) presents a more satisfactory account of the normative force of 
evidence than (LIB), and that Velleman’s ‘particularist’ alternative is even more 
lacking in explanatory power. If right, this suggests that, though subjects do not aim 
to believe the truth, if they did, they should believe (CON).
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Notes 
 
1
 Both quotes are from Malebranche 1997, p. 1. 
2
 For endorsements of (LIB) or some version of it, see Boghossian 2008, p. 101; Engel 
2002, p. 57; Humberstone 1992; Littlejohn 2010; Lynch 2004, p. 499; Millar 2004, p. 
43; Millar 2009, p. 140; Platts 1997, p. 256; Railton 1994; Shah 2003, p. 459; Shah 
and Velleman 2005, pp. 498-499; Steglich-Petersen 2006; Steglich-Petersen 2009; 
Wedgwood 2002, p. 267; Wiggins 1998, p. 148; Williams 1973, p. 136; Zagzebski 
2003, pp. 135-136.  A related idea is that true belief is the cognitive or epistemic goal 
(see, for example, Bonjour 1985, p. 7). 
An important caveat: those cited might not all understand (LIB) in the same 
way or as I do. I shall outline how I interpret (LIB) in §2 and consider alternative 
interpretations at various stages. 
3
 I endorse (CON) in Whiting 2010, p. 217. Cf. n4 below. 
4
 Millar, for example, readily switches from the phrase ‘belief aims at truth’ to the 
phrase ‘belief aims only at truth’ (2004, pp. 43-44; cf. Shah and Velleman 2005, p. 
498; Wedgwood 2002). 
Velleman repeatedly claims that belief aims at the truth (e.g. 2000, pp. 16-7, 
231, 244), though on occasion he formulates the aim as that of believing only what is 
true (e.g. 2000, pp. 25, 113). As I shall discuss below (§6), his considered remarks 
suggest a rather different understanding of belief’s aim to that which either (LIB) or 
(CON) capture, at least I construe them, an understanding which seems to be shared by, 
among others no doubt, Humberstone (1992), McHugh (Forthcoming) and Steglich-
Petersen (2009). 
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5
 Debates concerning the idea that belief aims (only) at truth overlap with debates 
concerning the value or goodness of true belief. I shall not explicitly engage with the 
latter here, though much of what follows bears on it. For discussion, see Whiting 
Manuscript. 
6
 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this journal for prompting this clarification. 
7
 The most prominent proponent of this view is Williamson (2000). For recent 
defences of the claim that belief aims at knowledge, see Engel 2004; McHugh 2011. 
For criticism, see Littlejohn 2010; Whiting Forthcoming. 
8
 Alston, for example, claims that ‘the epistemic point of view […] is defined by the 
aim of maximizing truth and minimizing falsity in a large body of beliefs’ (1989, pp. 
83-84), while David characterises the goal as one of ‘believing truths and not 
believing falsehoods’ (2001, p. 152; cf. Foley 2001; Kvanvig 2005). Note that these 
philosophers seem to be primarily concerned with the aim of inquiry, not of belief, or 
at least they do not really distinguish the two. 
9
 For hints, see n25 and n32 below. 
10
 Like Millar (2004, pp. 56ff), one might hold that belief is regulated for truth non-
intentionally by sub-personal mechanisms and in some cases intentionally by the 
subject. 
11
 This paragraph draws heavily on Alvarez 2010, ch. 4. 
12
 Note that, if believing (only) the truth is one’s intention, it does not follow that all 
of one’s beliefs are formed intentionally, any more than it would follow from the fact 
that my intention is to lose weight that all the weight loss I experience is intentional. 
13
 Certainly the remarks of many of those cited above (n2) and the uses they put (LIB) 
to suggest as much. Some of those who commit themselves in print to (LIB) might, on 
reflection, endorse (CON) once the contents of the aims each thesis attributes are made 
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explicit. In that case, the remarks that follow aim to show that they would be right to 
do so. 
14
 Since I am not sympathetic to the idea that there might be propositions which are 
neither true nor false, I shall assume that, if a proposition is not true, it is false. 
However, nothing in what follows hangs on this assumption. To allow for truth-value 
gaps, one need only replace talk of, say, the aim not to believe a proposition if it is 
false with talk of the aim not to believe a proposition if it is not true. 
15
 Of course, we speak loosely: I might say that I aim to have only sons, when context 
makes it clear that my aim is to have children, though only male children. 
16
 Velleman (2000, p. 251) raises this issue when motivating his conception of belief’s 
aim (see §6). In debates whose main focus is not, or not only, the idea that belief has 
an aim, in the sense explored here, it is very common to appeal to propositions 
concerning trivial matters so as to undermine the idea that true belief as such is 
something which subjects value or have as their goal (see, among many others, David 
2005, pp. 298-299; Feldman 2000, p. 683; Heal 1987/88; Kelly 2003, pp. 624-625; 
Sosa 2001). 
17
 Lynch (2009, p. 227) says something along these lines, though his explicit focus is 
the aim of inquiry, not of belief. 
18
 I discuss these issues in much more depth, in the context of a debate over the value 
of truth, in Whiting Manuscript. 
19
 Wedgwood (2002) suggests a restriction of this sort (though for his conception of 
talk of the aim of belief, see n23 below). 
Another way to make (LIB) more plausible would be to restrict it to those 
propositions one is curious about or interested in. For a critical investigation of this 
suggestion, see Grimm 2008. Though the focus of Grimm’s discussion appears to be 
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the aim of inquiry, not of belief, it makes it clear that to restrict (LIB) in this way 
would prevent it from being put to some of the explanatory uses discussed below. 
 Alternatively, rather than restrict the aim to those propositions one considers, 
one might restrict it to those propositions with respect to which one actually has, or is 
going to have, beliefs. I shall explore such a proposal in detail in §6. 
20
 I have encountered this objection several times in discussion. 
21
 Contra Kelly 2003, p. 627. 
22
 There are notorious problems facing the idea that belief is subject to normative 
considerations, stemming from the fact that one cannot believe at will (see Alston 
1989, ch. 5). Since this issue is tangential to the concerns of this paper, I shall not 
discuss it. 
23
 Boghossian (2008), Engel (2004), Lynch (2009) and Wedgwood (2002) present 
(CORRECT) and related norms as reformulations of (LIB), rather than as explained by it 
in any robust sense. Still, the reasons given below for doubting that (LIB) explains 
(CORRECT) equally count against the thought that the former is an interpretation of the 
latter.  
24
 I am not convinced by attempts to get around this problem which appeal to the 
thought that the relevant aim is constitutive of believing (Velleman 2000, p. 16). It 
might be true that having a certain aim is constitutive of φing and equally true that 
that aim is not worth pursuing (in which case, it is not worth φing). 
25
 It is hard to see how one could explain the fact that, at the personal level, subjects 
take true and false beliefs to be correct and incorrect respectively by appeal to belief’s 
aim if one understands that aim as a matter of belief states being causally regulated 
for truth and falsity at the sub-personal level.  
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26
 This presupposes something I have argued for elsewhere (Whiting 2010), namely, 
that to say that φing is correct is only to say that φing is acceptable or okay, not that 
φing is called for or required. 
27
 One finds this suggestion in many discussions of belief’s aim (see, for example, 
Boghossian 2008, p. 101; Wiggins 1998, p. 148; and Williams 1973, p. 137). By the 
same token, Engel is wrong to claim that, if ‘belief in general aims at truth’, ‘one 
ought to believe that p only if p is true’ (2002, pp. 128-9; cf. Littlejohn 2010, pp. 80-
81). 
28
 This example is not meant to suggest that only practical considerations make not 
believing a truth a mistake. Suppose, for example, that I have just seen a proof of a 
certain mathematical theorem. If one thinks that it would be wrong not to believe the 
theorem (I am not sure about this), one might account for this by appeal to a 
requirement of rationality, such as that one should (believe that q, if one believes that 
p and believes that p entails q). Whether there are such requirements and how to 
understand them is controversial. The important point for present purposes is that a 
proponent of (CON) can accept that there are circumstances in which, irrespective of 
practical considerations, we would take it to be incorrect not to believe a truth. 
29
 The idea that belief aims (only) at truth bears on the debate—dating back at least to 
the exchange between Clifford and James—concerning whether non-evidential 
considerations can justify or provide reason for belief. Appealing to the specification 
of belief’s aim which I favour, namely, (CON), one might suggest that a subject cannot 
take practical considerations to provide reason or justification for believing that p, 
since those considerations do not indicate that, were she to believe that p, she would 
accord with her aim to believe a proposition only if it is true. While I think there is 
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something to this line of thought, it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the 
issue further. 
30
 Some make the stronger claim that, if the fact that p is to be one’s evidence, one 
must know that p (Hyman 2006; Williamson 2000). I need not take a stand on this 
issue here. 
31
 For example, some hold that the notion of evidence is a normative notion and, 
specifically, that evidence that p is reason to believe that p (see Kelly 2007). 
Operating with this view, one could recast the issue of whether subjects take evidence 
that p to be a reason to believe that p as that of whether subjects take some fact 
indicating that p to be evidence that p (and so a reason to believe that p). 
32
 It is hard to see how one could explain the fact that, at the personal level, subjects 
take evidence to be a reason for or against believing by appeal to belief’s aim if one 
understands that aim as a matter of belief’s being causally regulated for truth and 
falsity at the sub-personal level. 
33
 Steglich-Petersen (2011) appeals to the idea that belief aims at truth in advancing a 
view according to which claims about what one ought to believe do not follow 
immediately from claims about what one has (most) reason to believe. Critically 
assessing his proposal is a task for another occasion. 
34
 For an account of reasons for belief of this sort, see Millar 2004, pp. 42ff; Millar 
2009; Velleman 2000, pp. 15-20, 182ff. This is a version of or related to the 
‘teleological’ conception of justification, which is close to orthodoxy in epistemology, 
according to which justification is a ‘means’ to the goal of true beliefs (cf. Alston 
1989, pp. 83-84; Bonjour 1985, pp. 7-8; David 2001; David 2005; Lynch 2009). 
Note that, given (NEOLIB), indications of the truth of a proposition would only 
be a reason to believe that proposition if one considers it, which seems wrong. David 
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(2001, p. 159) makes a similar point when discussing teleological conceptions of 
justification of the sort sketched above. 
35
 What counts as sufficient evidence is a thorny issue and, since doing so would 
distract us from more immediate concerns, I shall not tackle it here. 
36
 For (‘teleological’) proposals concerning epistemic norms along these lines, see 
Engel 2004, p. 82; Papineau 1999; Railton 1994, p. 75; Steglich-Petersen 2009, pp. 
395-396; Wedgwood 2002, §4. For similar proposals, not explicitly framed in terms 
of belief’s aim, see David 2001; David 2005; Foley 2001; Lynch 2005, pp. 13-15. 
37
 Owens (2003) denies that one can explain epistemic or rational norms by appeal to 
an aim of belief. This is not the place to engage with his arguments. For critical 
discussion, see McHugh Forthcoming; Steglich-Petersen 2009. 
38
 Contra Boghossian 2008, p. 101.  
39
 Contra Littlejohn 2010, pp. 80-81; Millar 2009, p. 149. 
40
 Cf. ‘Indicators of truth count as reasons for belief’ (Velleman 2000, p. 17). See also 
Kelly 2007. For similar suggestions by philosophers not participating in the debate 
over belief’s aim, see Hyman 2006; Reisner 2008. 
41
 The remarks in this paragraph accord with the view Nelson advances (2010), 
though his concern is not the idea that belief has an aim. Feldman briefly advances a 
similar line of thought (2000, pp. 678-679), in contrast to his earlier view (cp. 
Feldman and Conee 1985). 
42
 Matters might be different if Elliot were to believe, not only that Holly’s shoes are 
in the hall, but also that this is (sufficient) evidence that she is home. In that case, one 
might take Elliot to be violating a requirement of rationality (cf. n28 above). 
 Matters might also be different if one were to ask Elliot if there is no golden 
trumpet... First, this might lead Elliot to form a belief on this matter, or provide him 
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with some reason to do so. I shall consider such cases shortly. Second, it might 
prompt Elliot to consider what his evidence is evidence for, which might reintroduce 
requirements of rationality.  
43
 Humberstone (1992) presents a similar ‘particularized’ conception of belief’s aim, 
by appeal to which he suggests one might account for both belief’s correctness-
condition and the evidential norms governing the attitude. Perhaps this captures the 
considered conception of belief’s aim that others who explicitly endorse (LIB) have 
(cf. McHugh Forthcoming). 
Like Velleman, Sosa (2003) avoids attributing to subjects a general desire for 
(only) true beliefs. Instead, he suggests that, for any belief we have, we want it to be 
true rather than false, though he doubts this claim can do much explanatory work. 
44
 Contra Velleman 2000, pp. 182ff. 
45
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